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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
JUNE LARSON aka JUNE BECKMAN, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
Case No. 920864-CA 
vs. 
] 
ORLO LARSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a final judgment in the Fourth Judicial 
Distx i 
B ~Hvi5 presiding, affirming Commissioner Howard H. Maetani's 
Order ^- Order -•- <L*r. •.--• - jv.r-e. 
This •.,-. .• j/j.tl . " • -".rl ion, 
78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated (1992 - amended). This 
appeal is taken pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Did the trial court correctly rule that the provision 
I -1 •" • 0 relet I o paymerv ": 
the children's Social Security benefits . illegal? 
II. Did the trial court err by refusing : enforce the 
p r o v i s i o n v w ii l I /jiiiiilii ill i i I  | < M | I I | ternati ve to 
modify the Decree of Divorce to insure justice? 
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III. Did the trial court properly deny Defendant's request 
for attorney's fees, and should this Court award Plaintiff 
attorney's fees on appeal? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A trial court's determination that the provision at issue is 
illegal and consequently unenforceable is a question of law which 
should be reviewed under a correction of error standard. Fauver 
v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275, 1276 (Utah App. 1990). 
A trial court's decision to strike an Order to Show Cause 
and its refusal to modify a Decree of Divorce is a question of 
law which is reviewed for correctness. Grower v. Grover, 839 
P.2d 871, 873 (Utah App. H,S2). 
The decision to award attorney's fees is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 
814 (Utah App. 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, or 
rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on 
appeal is contained in the body of the brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties to this appeal were divorced on July 18, 1985. 
On January 7, 1987, the Decree of Divorce was modified based on a 
stipulation between the parties. (R. 403-410). 
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Defendant brought an Order to Show Cause in June of 1992 to 
enforce a provision relating to the payment of the children's 
Social Security benefits as contained in the Order to Modify 
Decree of Divorce. At the Order to Show Cause hearing, Plaintiff 
pled that the provision was illegal. (R. 479-484). The court 
commissioner refused to enforce the provision and struck the 
Order to Show Cause. (R. 504-506). 
Defendant objected to the court commissioner's ruling and 
filed a motion to enforce the Order to Modify Decree of Divorce 
and set aside the commissioner's ruling in the district court. 
The Honorable Lynn B. Davis affirmed the commissioner's ruling. 
He refused to rule on Defendant's mo'cion to enforce the decree of 
modification and to set *aide commissioner's ruling on the 
grounds that the motions were not properly before the court. (R. 
548) . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the original Decree of Divorce, Defendant was ordered to 
pay Plaintiff $35,000.00, with interest, in monthly payments as a 
property settlement. As a further property settlement, Defendant 
was ordered to pay Plaintiff an additional $10,000.00 with a 
maturity date of September 30, 1999. Both obligations were to be 
secured by a deed of trust on real property. 
Defendant was also ordered to pay child support in the 
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amount of $250.00 per month for the use and benefit of the two 
minor children. 
The Decree of Divorce was modified in January of 1987. A 
provision in the Order to Modify Decree of Divorce stated that in 
the event Defendant retired or died Plaintiff was required to 
place the minor children's Social Security benefits in a trust 
account. The children's Social Security benefits would then be 
used to satisfy, among other things, Defendant's child support 
obligation as well as his $10,000.00 property settlement 
obligation to Plaintiff.1 (R. 469). (A copy of the Order to 
Modify Decree of Divorce is contained in Appellant's Brief at 
24) . 
Defendant retired in July of 1992 at age 62. Plaintiff 
began receiving Social Security checks on behalf of the children. 
Subsequently, Plaintiff learned from the Social Security 
Administration that the provision may be illegal and that any 
misuse or misappropriation of the children's Social Security 
benefits may constitute a federal felony. (A copy of a letter 
sent by the Social Security Administration is contained in 
Appendix A). Plaintiff refused to place the children's Social 
Security benefits in the trust account. 
1
 Paragraph 3 of the original divorce decree, dated July 
18, 1985, also provides that the children's excess Social 
Security benefits would be used to reduce the amount of 
indebtedness on the property settlement between the parties. 
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Defendant brought an Order to Show Cause but did not bring a 
Petition to Modify. The court commissioner ruled that the above-
stated provision was illegal and struck the Order to Show Cause. 
Defendant objected to the commissioner's ruling and made various 
other motions. (R. 548). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Illegality of Stipulation 
Paragraph 3c(1) of the Order to Modify Decree of Divorce is 
illegal. It requires the minor children's excess Social Security 
benefits be used to pay off Defendant's property settlement 
obligation to Plaintiff. This provision violates the relevant 
Social Security statutes and regulations which make clear that 
children's Social Security benefits may only be used for the 
support and maintenance of the children. Any other or improper 
use may constitute conversion, which is a federal felony. 
Enforcement of the Illegal Stipulation 
If a stipulation is found to be illegal, the court has no 
choice but to declare the provision null and void. There is no 
necessity for a party to file a motion for relief from judgment. 
Modification 
A party seeking modification must file a Petition to Modify 
and that party must prove a permanent and substantial change of 
circumstances necessitating the modification. Defendant filed an 
Order to Show Cause but failed to file a Petition to Modify. He 
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also failed to present any evidence of permanent and substantial 
change of circumstances, which is required to obtain a 
modification. The proper course for Defendant to have obtained a 
modification is to file a Petition to Modify. 
Attorneyfs Fees 
Defendant presented no evidence on any of the factors 
relevant in awarding attorneyfs fees. His claim for attorneys 
fees is without merit. Plaintiff should be awarded attorney's 
fees on appeal as a result of having to defend this frivolous 
appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE PROVISION IN 
THE ORDER TO MODIFY DECREE OF DIVORCE WHICH ALLOWS THE 
MINOR CHILDREN'S SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS BE USED TO 
PAY OFF DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY SETTLEMENT IS ILLEGAL. 
Paragraph 3c(1) of the Order to Modify Decree of Divorce 
states: 
It is ordered that Defendant, in order to obtain Plaintiff's 
release of Trust Deed and Notice of Interest, ... 
c. Pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $10,000.00 on or before 
September 30, 1999 as follows: 
(1) The benefits which the children of the parties may 
receive as a result of Defendant's death or retirement are 
ordered escrowed in a trust account at Zion's Bank, Spanish Fork 
Branch, and are ordered disbursed to pay: 
(a) To the bank to pay fees of administering the 
account 
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(b) To Plaintiff to pay $125 per month per child, 
child support when due 
(c) The balance is ordered held in an interest-
bearing trust account, in the name of June Larson and credited 
for the payment of the property settlement payment of $10,000.00 
until such time as the balance held equals the then-present value 
of $10,000.00 due October 1, 1999, when calculated using Zion's 
Bank's prime rate at the time of the calculation. At the time 
the balance reaches the specified amount to satisfy the 
requirements set forth in this paragraph it is ordered 
immediately disbursed to Plaintiff in satisfaction of the 
$10,000.00 property settlement obligation, the account will be 
closed and all of the benefits which the children are entitled to 
receive as a result of Defendant's death or retirement will be 
paid to Defendant or Defendant's estate. From that amount, 
Defendant will continue to pay his child support obligation of 
$125.00 per month per child. 
The Social Security Act, Title 42, United States Code 
Section 401 et seq., provides that every dependent child of an 
individual who is entitled to Social Security benefits shall be 
entitled to a child's insurance benefit. Social Security 
Regulations require that such payments to a representative payee 
on behalf of a beneficiary must be used for current maintenance 
of the beneficiary. Any benefits not needed for current 
maintenance must be conserved or invested on the beneficiary's 
behalf. Social Security Administration Regulations No. 4-Subpart 
Q, Sections 404.1604, 404.1605. See also, Meeks v. Mutual of 
Omaha Insurance Company, 388 N.E.2d 1362, 1363 (111. App. 1979). 
20 C.F.R. Chapter III Section 404.2035 unequivocally states 
that a representative payee, the Plaintiff in this case, may only 
use the children's Social Security benefits for the use, 
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maintenance, and care of the children themselves. This section 
provides: 
A representative payee has a responsibility to-
(a) Use the payments he or she receives only for the 
use and benefit of the beneficiary in a manner and for the 
purposes he or she determines, under the guidelines in this 
subpart, to be in the best interests of the beneficiary; 
(b) Notify us of any event that will affect the amount 
of the benefits the beneficiary receives or the right of the 
beneficiary to receive benefits; 
(c) Submit to us, upon our request, a written report 
accounting for the benefits received; and 
(d) Notify us of any change in his or her 
circumstances that would affect performance of the payee 
responsibilities. 
The core essence of Title II of the Social Security Act 
benefit scheme is that those benefits are to be used only on 
behalf of the minor beneficiary. Frazier v. Pinqree, 612 F.Supp 
345, 347 (D.C. Fla. 1985). 
The children's Social Security benefits are to be used 
exclusively for their current maintenance. Current maintenance 
includes costs incurred in obtaining food, shelter, clothing, 
medical care, and personal comfort items. 20 C.F.R. Chapter III 
Section 404.2040. 
Paragraph 3c(1) of the Order to Modify Decree of Divorce, if 
enforceable, would require that Defendant's $10,000.00 property 
settlement obligation to Plaintiff be paid out of the proceeds of 
the minor children's Social Security benefits. Defendant's 
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property settlement obligation is unrelated to Defendant's duty 
of support or to the children's maintenance. This paragraph is 
illegal because it violates both Sections 404.2035 and 404.2040. 
The parties in this case had no authority, power or right 
to bargain away the Social Security benefits of the minor 
children. The children's right to receive Social Security 
benefits belongs to them. A child's right to support is an 
"unalienable right, belonging to the child, and cannot be 
bartered away by the child's parent or parents." Fauver v. 
Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275, 1278-79 (Utah App. 1990)(citations 
omitted). 
The facts in Fuller v. Fuller, 360 N.E.2d 357 (Ohio App.2d 
1976) are similar to the case at bar. In Fuller, the Defendant 
was substantially in arrears in his child support when he became 
disabled. Because of his disability, the minor children were 
awarded $268.00 per month in Social Security benefits. This 
amount was $68.00 more than the child support order. Id. at 358. 
In a judgment order, the trial court found that the 
Defendant was in arrears in child support. The court ordered 
that the excess Social Security benefits could be credited toward 
Defendant's arrearage in child support. Ibid. 
In reversing the trial court's holding, the appellate court 
stated: 
[T]he benefit inures directly to the child, 
notwithstanding the prerequisite status of 
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the parent. No indices of the father's 
ownership ever attach to these funds. Thus 
the court is, in effect, ordering the 
children to pay the accrued arrearages for 
their own support. Ibid. 
It should be noted that even though in Fuller the excess 
Social Security benefits were used to pay off past due child 
support obligations, which are related to the children's 
maintenance, the appellate court nevertheless reversed the trial 
court's ruling. See also. Smith v. Smith, 651 P.2d 1209, 1210 
(Ariz. App. 1982)(child's excess Social Security benefits cannot 
be used to satisfy Defendant's obligation to pay the medical and 
dental bills of the children); Meeks v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance 
Company, 388 N.E.2d 1362, 1363 (111. App. 1979)(payments made to 
representative payee are not income to the payee but are income 
to and the exclusive property of the minor child). In the case 
at bar, the excess Social Security benefits were to be used to 
pay off Defendant's property settlement obligation, which is not 
remotely related to the children's maintenance. 
20 C.F.R. Chapter III Section 404.2035 and 404.2040, Title 
II of the Social Security Act Section 202(d)(1), Social Security 
Regulations, and case law make clear that paragraph 3c(1) of the 
Order to Modify Decree of Divorce is illegal and consequently 
unenforceable. This court should uphold the trial court's 
finding that the paragraph is illegal and unenforceable as a 
matter of law. 
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POINT II 
A COURT MAY NOT ENFORCE AN ILLEGAL PROVISION IN A 
DECREE OF DIVORCE OR MODIFY IT ABSENT A PETITION TO 
MODIFY. 
Defendant in his brief apparently argues that even if the 
provision is illegal, the trial court abused its discretion by 
failing to either enforce the decree or modify it despite its 
illegality because of Defendants alleged reliance on it. 
Defendants reasoning is that even if the stipulation is 
illegal, the parties are bound by their stipulations unless 
relieved from them by motion to the court and in the interests of 
justice and fair play. In order to withdraw a stipulation, the 
party must file a timely motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which must be done within three 
months. (Brief of Appellant at 8-11). 
Defendant concludes that because Plaintiff failed to file a 
Rule 60(b) motion and because Defendant relied upon the 
stipulation, the court should enforce it. Defendant cites 
Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403 (Utah 1990), in support of this 
reasoning. 
A. Maxwell v. Maxwell. 
The facts and holding in Maxwell are easily distinguishable 
from the case at bar. Consequently, Maxwell provides little, if 
any, help in resolving the issues in this appeal. In Maxwellf 
the parties were divorced pursuant to a stipulated divorce 
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decree. The parties stipulated that the wife would receive one-
half of the husband's total monthly retirement benefit. The 
husband began paying the wife one-half of his gross retirement 
benefits. Subsequently, the husband received an increase in 
these benefits, but failed to account or pay the wife her one-
half share of the increase. The wife filed an Order to Show 
Cause seeking her one-half share of the total retirement benefits 
as provided in the stipulated decree. 
On appeal, the husband argued that the trial courtfs order 
violated the Uniform Services Former Spouses Protection Act, 10 
U.S.C.A. Section 1408 (1983)( hereinafter USFSPA). Under the 
USFSPA, state courts are allowed to treat disposable retirement 
pay as community property divisible upon divorce. They are not 
authorized to treat total retirement pay as community or marital 
property divisible upon divorce. 
The husband alleged mistake in entering the stipulation in 
order to avoid the stipulation and avoid liability for the 
payments he failed to make. This Court held that the stipulation 
was binding upon the husband and that he could not avoid 
liability by claiming mistake. This Court also refused to modify 
the Decree of Divorce. 
It should be noted that in Maxwell, the stipulated provision 
at issue was not illegal nor did it violate the USFSPA. The 
USFSPA merely provides that a state court does not have authority 
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to treat total retirement pay as community property. There is no 
provision in the USFSPA that prevents a party from voluntarily 
stipulating to pay his or her retirement benefits to his or her 
former spouse. This situation is entirely analogous to a 
situation in which one spouse stipulates to giving the other 
spouse his or her separate property as part of a division of the 
parties' marital property. Upon becoming disenchanted with the 
property distribution, the spouse then claims mistake of fact in 
entering the stipulation to avoid his or her stipulations on the 
grounds that the trial court does not have authority to award 
separate property. 
In short, the husband in Maxwell was claiming mistake of 
fact to avoid liability. He had voluntarily entered an agreement 
to pay his ex-wife one-half of his total retirement benefits. 
These total retirement benefits were his own property and even 
though the court did not have authority to award these benefits 
to the wife, the husband was certainly free to do with them as he 
pleased. To avoid the stipulation, the proper course would have 
been to file a Rule 60(b) motion. 
The case at bar is entirely different. The parties are 
bargaining away the children's benefits. 
[T]he right to receive child support is an 
unalienable right, belonging to the child, 
and cannot be bartered away by the child's 
parent or parents. Fauver v. Hansen, 803 
P.2d at 1278. 
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Neither party in the case at bar had the power or authority 
to enter any stipulation or agreement to barter away property 
that belongs exclusively to the minor children. A child's Social 
Security benefits may not be used to discharge a parent's 
personal debt not related to the support of the child. 20 C.F.R. 
Chapter III Section 404.2035 and 404.2040. 
In the case at bar, Plaintiff is not claiming mistake of 
fact as in Maxwell. The provision is illegal and is 
unenforceable as matter of law. In fact, if the provision is 
enforced, Plaintiff could be subject to being charged with a 
federal felony. (See letter from Social Security Administration 
contained in Appendix A, warning Plaintiff that misuse of 
Security Social funds is a federal felony). 
B. Enforcement of the Illegal Stipulation. 
Defendant also alleges in his brief that parties are 
unconditionally bound by their stipulations unless they file the 
proper motions for relief from judgment. Although courts 
ordinarily pay strong attention and enforce stipulations between 
parties, courts are not bound by parties' stipulations when 
points of law requiring judicial determinations are involved. A 
court has the power to set aside a stipulation entered into 
inadvertently or for justifiable cause. First of Denver Mortgage 
Investors v. C.N. Zundel, 600 P.2d 521, 527 (Utah 1979)(citations 
omitted). 
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The above language illustrates that a court may set aside a 
judgment, order, or proceeding for any justifiable cause. There 
is no requirement that a party must file a Rule 60(b) motion as 
Defendant incorrectly contends. 
The justifiable cause language in First of Denver certainly 
contemplates and encompasses the setting aside of any provision 
which is illegal. Otherwise, parties could circumvent any 
statutory or case law by merely stipulating to agreements that 
are illegal or contrary to legal principles. 
Contrary to Defendants argument that a court should enforce 
a provision despite its illegality to insure justice, case law 
unequivocally establishes that the effect of an illegal contract 
or agreement is that it is null and void and a court has no other 
choice but to declare the contract provision unenforceable. 
No principle of law is better settled than 
that a party to an illegal contract cannot 
come into a court of law and ask to have his 
illegal objects carried out;...the law in 
short will not aid either party to an illegal 
agreement; it leaves the parties were it 
finds them. 
17 C.J.S. Section 272 p. 1188. 
Every contract in violation of law is void and the courts 
will not lend their aid to the enforcement of, nor permit a 
recovery under contracts made in violation of law prohibiting 
them or declaring them unlawful. Baker v. Latses. 206 P. 553, 
555 (Utah 1922). See also Neil v. Utah Wholesale Grocery 
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Company, 210 P. 201, 203 (Utah 1922)(contract made in 
contravention of a statute is void and unenforceable). 
For the court to enter a finding in contravention of 
statutory requirements is in direct violation of the statutory 
duty of that court to provide for the support of the minor 
children of the parties to a divorce action• Bingham v. Bingham, 
629 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Okl. App. 1981). 
C. Modification of Decree. 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
by not modifying the Decree of Divorce to insure justice. In 
order to modify a decree, a party must file a petition to modify 
pursuant to Rule 6-404 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. That rule provides: 
(1) Proceedings to modify a divorce decree 
shall be commenced by the filing of a 
petition to modify in the original divorce 
action. No request for a modification of an 
existing decree shall be raised by way of an 
order to show cause (emphasis added). 
A party may not proceed by means of an Order to Show Cause, 
but is required to file a Petition to Modify the child support 
order and demonstrate therein that there has been a material 
change of circumstances since the entry of the order that 
warrants modification under Section 78-45-7(10), Utah Code 
Annotated (1992 as amended). Grover v. Grover, 839 P.2d 871, 873 
(Utah App. 1992). 
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If there is no service pursuant to Rule 6-404 of the Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration and Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, nor a finding of changed circumstances, a court 
does not have jurisdiction to modify or amend a decree. Adelman 
v. Adelman. 815 P.2d 741, 745 (Utah App. 1991). 
A party seeking modification must not only file a Petition 
to Modify but must prove a substantial and permanent change of 
circumstances necessitating the modification. Kiesel v. Kiesel. 
619 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Utah 1980); Stettler v. Stettler. 713 P.2d 
699, 701 (Utah 1985). 
In the case at bar, Defendant filed an Order to Show Cause 
instead of a Petition to Modify pursuant to Rule 6-404 of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Furthermore, there was no 
showing of changed circumstances. Therefore, the court is 
without jurisdiction to modify or amend the decree, which is why 
the trial court ruled that Defendants motions were not properly 
before it. (See page 4 of the Ruling on Defendant1 Objection to 
Ruling of Court Commissioner, Defendant's Motion to Enforce 
Decree of Modification, to Set Aside Commissioner's Ruling and 
For Other Relief). (Brief of Appellant at 35). 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD PLAINTIFF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL. 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
by refusing to award Defendant his attorney's fees. (Brief of 
Appellant at 15). The decision to award attorney's fees is 
within the sound discretion of the trial court. The award must 
be based on evidence of the financial need of the other spouse to 
pay and the reasonableness of the requested fees. Whitehead v. 
Whitehead. 836 P.2d 814, 817 (Utah App. 1992). The party seeking 
the award of attorney's fees must offer sufficient evidence 
regarding attorney's fees at trial. The award must be supported 
by evidence of the financial need of the recipient and the 
reasonableness of the award. Mauahan v. Maucrhan, 770 P.2d 156, 
162 (Utah App. 1989). Defendant proffered no evidence at the 
hearing in the trial court on Defendant's objection to the court 
commissioner's ruling as to any of the factors relevant in 
awarding attorney's fees. 
On appeal Defendant has failed to show that the trial 
court's denial of attorney's fees manifests a clear abuse of 
discretion. Defendant's argument for attorney's fees is without 
merit. 
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Plaintiff should be awarded her attorney's fees on appeal 
pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
That rule provides that if the court determines that: 
[An] appeal taken under these rules is either 
frivolous or for delay, it shall award just 
damages, which may include...reasonable 
attorney's fees, to the prevailing party. 
Rule 33 defines a frivolous appeal as one that is not 
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on 
a good faith argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law. 
Plaintiff's posture on appeal is that of Appellee. She was 
forced to spend considerable attorney's fees to defend this 
action both on behalf of herself and the minor children because 
of Defendant's actions. 
The legality of the provision in question, the effect of an 
illegal provision, and a trial court's lack of jurisdiction to 
modify a decree absent a Petition to Modify are all issues of 
settled law. Defendant's appeal is not grounded in fact, not 
warranted by existing law, and is not based on a good faith 
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. 
Pursuant to the foregoing, Plaintiff would respectfully 
request that she -be awarded a reasonable amount for defending 
this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The provision in question is illegal because it violates 
Federal Social Security Regulations and relevant case law. Since 
19 
it is illegal, it cannot be enforced as Defendant contends 
because courts do not have the power or authority to enforce 
illegal stipulations. The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by refusing to modify the Decree of Divorce due to 
Defendant's failure to file a Petition to Modify. Defendant's 
claim for attorney's fees is without merit. Plaintiff should be 
awarded attorney's fees for defending this frivolous appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
'S/SS& 
WILFORD N, HANSEN, JR. 
Counsel \ o r Dcfeendaots 
Plaintftf 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed or hand-delivered true 
and correct copies of the foregoing on the ^ ^ day of June, 
1993, by first-class United States mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Two copies to: 
C. Robert Collins 
405 East State Road 
P.O. Box 243 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Original and seven copies to: 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
W ^ 
WILFORD N. HANSEN, JR. 
Counsel for De£widcmts 
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APPENDIX A 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Social Security Administration 
173 E. 100 N. 
Provo, UT 84606 
(800) 772-1213 
July E3, 199B 
Wil-ford Hansen, 
A11 or ney-a t-1aw 
117E E Highway b #7 
Payson, UT 84651 
Dear Mr. Hansen: 
June Buckman has asked me to write you concerning the receipt of 
Social Security benefits by her daughters. Her two daughters have 
been receiving $470.00 each per month on the account o-f Orlo 
Larson. They would have received $312.00 each on the account of 
Leonard Buckman. Part o-f the reason that they received $470.00 per 
month , however, is that they were eligible on both records. The 
computation involved is a complex one called a "combined family 
maximum." There is no way to "allocate" part of the payment to 
each of the wage earners. 
Mrs. Bukman also raised the issue of use of Social Security 
benefits. CFR Sections 404 and 416 cover the responsibilities of 
representative payees under the Social Security Act, as amended. 
It is mandated that a representative payee (Ms. Buckman has been 
the representative payee for her daughters) use the Social Security 
funds to first of all provide for the current needs of the 
beneficiary. After all current needs have been met, funds may be 
conserved for foreseeable future needs. Any use of Social Secuntv 
funds other than these may constitute "conversion of benefits" a 
crime considered to be a federal -felony. -^> „ ^ 
